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Abstract
People’s values are a critical determinant of their behavior. But, how do values
form and what causes them to change? This paper proposes a theory of value for-
mation. In the model, agents choose values, motivated by economic considerations
and, crucially, also by the desire for esteem. The comparative statics are driven by
the following tension: agents obtain more esteem from peers if they conform in their
choice of values; but they may obtain more self-esteem if they differentiate. This
tension explains why, for instance, peer effects are sometimes positive and some-
times negative. Three applications are considered, related to: schools, inner cities,
and organizational resistance. (JEL: Z10, J01.)
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1 Introduction
The values people hold are critical determinants of outcomes in many different contexts:
for instance, in schools, in inner cities, and in firms. But, how do they form? What
causes them to change? This paper proposes a theory of value formation. The model has
applications to many disparate problems: to give three examples, why some schools fail,
while others succeed; why US inner cities suffer from persistent high unemployment;
and why workers, in many firms, put up resistance.
Agents in the model choose their values.1 The choice of values is motivated by eco-
nomic considerations but, crucially, also by the desire for esteem. There are two compo-
nents of esteem; these components result in conflicting desires. On the one hand, people
have a desire to be esteemed by peers, which is satisfied by conforming to them. On the
other hand, people have a desire for self-esteem, which is often best satisfied by differ-
entiating. This basic tension – between the desires to conform and differentiate – drives
the paper’s results.
The baseline model is a two-player, simultaneous-move game. Players make three
choices. First, they choose effort at two activities. The example of a school is carried
through the paper. Corresponding to two traditional categories in US schools – “nerds”
and “burnouts” (who are sometimes in rock bands) – these activities are referred to
as academics and rock music (music for short). Achievement at academics (music)
depends upon a player’s effort and upon his ability. Second, players choose whether
or not to value achievement at academics and achievement at music. Third, players
choose whether to initiate social interaction (potentially at a cost). Social interaction
takes place if either player initiates it.
There are three key assumptions. Assumption 1: the basis upon which a player
confers esteem depends upon his values. A player who only values academics (music)
confers esteem only on the basis of academic (musical) achievement. Assumption 2:
players are esteemed for their relative achievement. Assumption 3: players value self-
esteem; when they interact, they also value the esteem of the other player. There is an
1The assumption that people select values is consistent with a large literature in social psychology,
discussed below. Note that I do not mean to suggest people are fully conscious of choosing values, just as
agents in standard models make choices more or less consciously.
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extensive discussion below of how these assumptions match the psychology literature.2
Equilibria of the model resolve the tension between the desire to conform and the
desire to differentiate. In equilibrium, players focus their effort on a single activity
(whichever has the highest esteem-returns to effort). They may or may not focus on the
same activity. Players choose to value the activities they focus on when their achieve-
ment is sufficiently high. Players with the same (different) values tend to seek (avoid)
interaction: a property known as value homophily.3 Values can be said to shape players’
behavior, since they affect the esteem-returns to effort.
Themodel’s comparative statics show how different policies and shocks affect values
and behavior. Consider the effect in the model of encouraging social interaction (an
example would be putting students in the same classroom). Players have a greater
desire to conform when they interact, since only when they interact do they care about
receiving the other player’s esteem. Thus, encouraging interaction – reducing its cost –
makes players more likely to focus on – and value – the same activities.
The model also makes predictions about the effect of peer quality on own perfor-
mance. An increase in peers’ academic ability, it turns out, has an ambiguous effect
on own academic achievement. Own achievement is increasing in peer ability when
peer ability is low and decreasing in peer ability when peer ability is high. On the one
hand, the desire to conform can lead a player to exert more effort at academics when
his peer’s academic ability increases. On the other hand, an increase in peer academic
ability makes it harder to obtain self-esteem through a focus on academics. Thus, a
player might decide, when his peer’s academic ability increases, to switch from a focus
on academics to a focus on music. This finding reconciles conflicting results on peer
effects. While most studies report positive peer effects (see, for instance, Hanushek et
al. (2003)), a significant number report negative peer effects. For example, Carrell et
al. (2013) find that low-ability students at the US Air Force Academy perform worse
academically when they are placed in higher-ability squadrons.
2While one approach to these issues is to derive status/esteem preferences from economic primitives
(e.g., Cole et al. (1992)), the approach in this paper allows for simple comparative statics and further
insights into policy changes. The present paper bases its “reduced form approach” on robust findings
in psychology and thus affords insights into the implications of preferences for esteem and status on
economic outcomes.
3For a survey of work on value homophily, see McPherson et al. (2001). There is considerable evidence
that people have a tendency to sort into groups according to values.
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The model’s assumptions accord with the theoretical perspectives and empirical
findings of a large literature in social psychology on esteem. Dating back at least to
William James (1890), esteem has been seen as related to values. In Principles of Psychol-
ogy, James observed that a person’s self-esteem depends not only upon his achievements
but also upon the value he places upon them. Contemporary approaches assume that
people implicitly choose values, placing more value on domains where they perform
well, so as to enhance self-esteem (see Crocker and Wolfe (2001) and Osborne and Jones
(2011) for reviews).4 A variety of findings are seen as providing empirical confirma-
tion. For instance, developmental studies find that as children grow older, they increas-
ingly describe as “important” those activities at which they excel (see Harter (1986));
the esteem of poorly performing students has been shown to improve when they adopt
deviant values (see Rosenberg (1979), Gold (1978), Kaplan (1978, 1980), and Rosenberg
et al. (1989)); when individuals become disabled, they typically devalue physical attrac-
tiveness and physical accomplishments (seeWright (1960)); and values have been shown
to change in old age as competencies decline (see Brandtsta¨dter and Greve (1994)).5
It has also long been recognized that self-esteem depends upon individuals’ com-
parisons with peers: the seminal paper being Festinger (1954). Several experiments
have found that the value subjects place on activities depends upon how well they per-
form relative to peers – rather than how well they perform absolutely (see Tesser and
Campbell (1980, 1982)). Additionally, recent work by Marsh and coauthors argues that
students find it harder to achieve high self-esteem through a focus on academics when
peer academic ability is higher (see especially Marsh (2008) and Seaton et al. (2009)).
The model also accords with a third important idea in psychology: that people seek
the esteem/approval of peers and are motivated, in consequence, to conform. Psycholo-
gists refer to this as “normative social influence” (see, for instance, Latane´ (1981), Lerner
and Tetlock (1999), Cialdini and Goldstein (2004), and Zaki et al. (2011)). Experiments
on normative social influence date back to Asch (1951); he showed subjects a line and
4In their Psychological Review article, Crocker and Wolfe (2001) note that: “the view that people are
selective in the domains on which they stake their self-esteem has shaped theory and research on self-
esteem for decades.” (p. 598)
5 Crocker and Major (1989) also argue that the low observed correlation between esteem and achieve-
ment is, in large measure, explained by individuals’ “selectively devaluing. . . those performance dimen-
sions on which they. . . fare poorly.” (p. 616)
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asked them to judge which of three other lines was of equal length; they answered after
observing seven other participants – confederates of the experimenter – give an identi-
cal, wrong answer. Most subjects followed suit with the wrong answer on at least one
occasion. In contrast, when subjects’ responses were kept private, in a slight modifica-
tion of the experiment, conformity significantly decreased (see Asch (1956)): suggesting
that subjects had conformed in the original experiment largely because they sought peer
esteem/approval, rather than because of changes in their beliefs. Neurological evidence
is in line with this interpretation. In a further replication of the Asch experiment study-
ing subjects’ brain activity with fMRI, Berns et al. (2005) found subjects who failed to
conform (by answering correctly) showed heightened activity in areas of the brain de-
voted to negative emotion and to the modulation of social behavior (the right amygdala
and the right caudate nucleus).6
Related Literature
This paper studies the process by which culture/values form and change. While this
topic is understudied in economics, its importance for understanding organizational
and societal dysfunction has been widely recognized (see Collier (2016) and Guiso et
al. (2006) for a discussion).7 One theoretical approach is offered by Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001), who study the parental decision to instill values in their children. This
paper considers a distinct mechanism, whereby the conflict between conformity and
differentiation drives the process of cultural formation.
The paper brings together three forces – (1) flexible values, (2) social comparison, and
(3) the desire for peer esteem/approval – which give rise to a conflict between confor-
mity and differentiation. These forces have appeared in separate treatments in previous
literature.
The paper relates to cognitive dissonance models (see especially Benabou and Tirole
(2002, 2011), Oxoby (2003, 2004), Rabin (1994), and Akerlof and Dickens (1982)) since
they assume agents’ beliefs or values are flexible (Assumption 1). The work of Oxoby
6Following Asch, psychologists have explored the role of normative influence in many different con-
texts. See, for example, Schultz (1999) regarding recycling campaigns and Nolan et al. (2008) regarding
reduction in energy use.
7The model captures a set of interactions – between behavior, values, and social networks – that Collier
(2016) argues are critical for understanding the process of cultural formation.
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(2003, 2004) is particularly related as he also assumes agents make social comparisons
(Assumption 2). Agents consequently differentiate in his model; however, they lack
a desire to conform. Neither Assumptions 2 nor 3 are present in Benabou and Tirole
(2011); however, they generate conformity by a complementary mechanism.8
Another class of related models is based on the concept of identity (see especially
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002)). The choice of identity is similar to a choice of values;
hence these models make a variant of Assumption 1. These models also typically make
a variant of Assumption 3: that the utility from adopting an identity depends upon the
number of adherents. This assumption gives rise to conformity. However, agents in
existing identity models lack a desire to differentiate.9
There are also several related models in which values are fixed (Assumption 1 is
absent). In particular, Bernheim (1994) and Frank (1985) assume agents seek esteem
from peers (Assumption 3); they also assume peers’ views of an agent are based upon
social comparison (Assumption 2).10
Cicala et al. (2011) relates to the predictions regarding peer effects. They have sug-
gested that a Roy model might explain why we see both positive and negative peer
effects. However, values – and their determination – are not a focus. This paper’s model
additionally speaks to the possible convergence or divergence of values within a popu-
lation.
Finally, the paper relates to the literature on contests. The model – which is effec-
tively a contest for esteem – shows how ideas from this literature can be applied to yield
new insight into how values form and change. The results are reminiscent of those in ex-
8Unlike this paper’s model, in which values are chosen, values are inferred in Benabou and Tirole
(2011). Agents conform in their model because they infer the appropriate values from others’ behavior.
9The model in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) unambiguously predicts, in contrast to this paper’s model,
that own academic performance improves when peer academic ability increases. Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) make a distinct argument as to why low ability students might be more inclined to adopt deviant
identities in higher ability schools. They consider the possibility schools/teachers might set the “pre-
scriptions” associated with holding an academic identity. Teachers set tougher prescriptions in higher
ability schools; these tougher prescriptions increase the inclination of low ability students to adopt de-
viant identities.
10In Bernheim’s model, agents are esteemed when they are believed to have high ability. Since high
relative achievement signals high ability, esteem is effectively conferred based upon relative achievement.
In Frank (1985)’s Choosing the Right Pond, agents compare themselves to those in their pond. Frank’s
model is primarily concerned with agents’ choice of ponds (comparison groups) – a choice that is absent
in this paper.
5
isting contest models: in particular, just as contest models find that competition is most
intense when players are closely matched (see, for instance, Lazear and Rosen (1981)
and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)), players exert the most effort at academics (compete
most intensely) when they possess similar academic ability. With its choice of activities,
the model particularly relates to the literature onmulti-battlefield contests, such as Borel
(1921)’s Colonel Blotto Game (see Kovenock and Roberson (2012) for a review).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. Section 3
shows how the model can be extended to allow for more than two players and more
than two activities. Section 4 discusses three applications, related to: schools, US inner
cities, and organizational resistance. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
The baseline model is a two-player, simultaneous-move game. Players also compare
their actions to the fixed behavior of a background population of n agents.11
The players (i ∈ {1, 2}) make three choices. They choose (1) effort at two activities
(ei1, ei2 ≥ 0), (2) whether to value achievement at those activities (θi1, θi2 ∈ {0, 1}), and
(3) whether to initiate interaction with the other player (xi ∈ {0, 1}). Interaction takes
place if either player initiates it (if x1 = 1 or x2 = 1).
We will carry the example of a school throughout the paper. Corresponding to two
common categories in US schools – “nerds” and “burnouts” – we will refer to activity
1 as academics and activity 2 as rock music (or, music for short). Players’ achievement
at activities depends upon both effort and ability. More specifically, achievement at
academics is given by: ai1 = αiei1, where αi > 0 denotes player i’s ability at academics.
Players may differ in their academic ability; for simplicity, we assume players have the
same musical ability, which we normalize to 1: so that ai2 = ei2.
11The model naturally extends to a many-player game, in which the behavior of the entire population
is endogenous. We consider such an extension in Section 3.
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The players have the following utility function:
Ui = −1
2
(ei1 + ei2)
2 − kxi + Ei.
There is an economic component to the utility function and a non-economic component.
The first two terms are the economic component. They reflect the cost of exerting effort
and the cost k of initiating social interaction. k can be positive or negative. The final
term,Ei, whichwewill discuss presently, reflects players’ desire to be esteemed. To sim-
plify the analysis, we assume players do not exert effort at music if they are otherwise
indifferent; nor do they value activities when otherwise indifferent.
There are two sources of esteem utility (Ei). Players value self-esteem (Eii ). When
players interact, they also value being esteemed by the other player (Eji ). More pre-
cisely:
Ei = E
i
i +G(x1, x2) · Eji ,
where G = 1 if social interaction takes place (if x1 or x2 = 1) and G = 0 otherwise. Ob-
serve that players may derive positive or negative esteem utility from social interaction
depending upon whether they are esteemed by the other player (Eji > 0) or disesteemed
(Eji < 0).
Let us now discuss the basis upon which esteem is conferred. The esteem player i
grants a player l – l may refer to himself or to the other player – depends upon player
l’s achievement relative to others at activities valued by player i. More precisely, player
i’s esteem for player l is given by:
Eil =
∑2
s=1
θis(als − as).
Observe that esteem is only conferred for achievement at valued activities (activities for
which θis = 1 rather than 0), and esteem is conferred based upon relative achievement
(als − as). as denotes the average achievement of a comparison group or “reference
group” at activity s.
We assume players compare themselves to one another (i.e., both players are in the
reference group). We assume players also compare themselves to a background popu-
lation of n agents with 0 achievement at both activities. Consequently, a1 = a11+a21n+2 and
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a2 =
a12+a22
n+2 .
We will focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria, henceforth referred to as the equilib-
ria of the game.
2.2 Discussion of the Model
Let us pause briefly to discuss a number of modeling choices.
First, we assume players, in addition to comparing themselves to one another, com-
pare themselves to a background population of n agents. The reason we need a back-
ground population is that, without it, it is impossible for both players to be above av-
erage at an activity. We find that players always focus on different activities when a
background population is absent (n = 0). As n increases, players compare themselves
less to one other; consequently, their desire to differentiate becomes less intense and they
may end up focusing on the same activities in equilibrium. Section 3 considers a many-
player version of the model. In that case, it is unnecessary to include a background
population; the behavior of the entire population is endogenous.
Second, we assume players compare themselves to one another regardless of whether
they interact. In reality, people probably compare themselves particularly to those with
whom they interact. This aspect of social interaction is a prominent feature of other
models such as Frank (1985), who assumes that agents especially compare themselves
to those in their own “pond.” We abstract away from this aspect of social interaction
in order to focus squarely on another aspect: the concern it creates about how one is
esteemed by peers. One could imagine constructing a richer model, though, in which
both aspects of social interaction are present.
Third, the model implicitly assumes that players observe one another’s values. In
reality, values cannot be directly observed; they are, instead, inferred. Nonetheless, this
assumption may be reasonable. Work by psychologists on “theory of mind” shows that
people have a talent for intuiting values from behavior (see Baron-Cohen (1995)).
Fourth, in the model, players can unilaterally initiate interaction (i.e., interaction
takes place if x1 = 1 or x2 = 1). We might alternatively have assumed both play-
ers must agree in order for interaction to take place (i.e., interaction takes place only if
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x1 = x2 = 1). The choice of one assumption over the other does not reflect a strict prefer-
ence. The comparative statics of the model (which will be our main focus) look similar
regardless of which assumption we make.
Fifth, there is an economic cost associated with exerting effort but there are no eco-
nomic benefits. We might have assumed, for instance, that players are economically
incentivized to perform well academically. While benefits are not explicitly included,
we can think of the effort cost function as the cost of effort net of any benefits. Under
this interpretation, incentivizing players to perform well academically is like increasing
their academic abilities (α1,α2).
Sixth, some results depend upon the curvature of the utility function. The effort cost
function has the special property that the marginal cost of effort is the same at both
activities. A consequence is that players focus all their effort on one activity (whichever
has the higher esteem-returns) and value at most one activity. This functional form was
chosen precisely because it has these properties. But, it may be worthwhile to consider
alternative functional forms. A different effort cost function (for instance, 12e
2
i1 +
1
2e
2
i2)
allows for the possibility players will exert effort at – and value – multiple activities.
Seventh, there is a discrete choice whether to value an activity or not. It might be
more realistic had we assumed players can value activities more or less: for instance
choose θis ∈ [0, 1] rather than θis ∈ {0, 1}. In fact, we can allow agents to choose values
from the unit interval. Doing so has no effect on the outcome/equilibria: since players
will always choose to place maximal or minimal value on activities. We would see
players valuing activities more or less, however, if, additionally, we assumed it is costly
to value an activity more. It would be a worthwhile extension to consider this case.
Eighth, just as players’ values might be made less discrete, it might also be worth-
while as an extension to consider a case in which interaction is more continuous. In such
an extension, the amount player i cares about how he is esteemed by player j would de-
pend upon the intensity of interaction.
Ninth, agents have complete flexibility to choose their values in the model. In real-
ity, though, some values are probably universal and hard-wired. We consider the case
of complete flexibility for simplicity, but we might capture lack-of-flexibility by plac-
ing constraints on players’ choice of values. It is worth noting that, when agents are
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completely free to choose their values, they end up having positive self-esteem in equi-
librium (Eii ≥ 0); constraints on values may help explain why, in reality, some people
suffer from negative self-esteem (see, for instance, Owens (1994)).
Finally, the model is static. We consider changes to the system but through compar-
ative static exercises. The comparative statics correspond to a dynamic setup in which
agents can change values from one period to the next at low cost. This approach has the
benefit of simplicity and it produces sensible results (i.e., results that fit a wide variety of
applications). It is possible, though, that some insight could be gained from a dynamic
version of the model in which the cost of changing values is high rather than low.
2.3 Properties of Equilibria
It is useful to relate four properties of equilibria, regarding respectively: effort, values,
esteem, and interaction. The constraints imposed by these properties will enable us to
succinctly describe the equilibrium set in the next section; at the same time, they yield
intuition regarding many aspects of the equilibria.
Effort
Players focus their effort exclusively on one activity in equilibrium. They do not
necessarily focus on the same activities. Players focus on whichever activity has the
highest esteem-returns to effort. The esteem returns to effort are higher when: (1) a
player is more able at an activity; (2) a player personally values the activity (θ∗is = 1); and
(3) a player interacts with another player who values the activity (θ∗js = 1 and G = 1).
The following lemma gives further detail. Formal proofs are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. LetMi1 andMi2 denote the marginal esteem-returns to effort at academics and music
respectively. An equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) IfMi1 ≥Mi2, player i focuses on academics:
e∗i1 = Mi1, e∗i2 = 0,
(2) IfMi1 < Mi2, player i focuses on music:
e∗i1 = 0, e∗i2 = Mi2,
10
Furthermore:
Mi1 = (θ∗i1 +G(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) · θ∗j1)
(
n+1
n+2αi
)
andMi2 = (θ∗i2 +G(x∗1, x∗2) · θ∗j2)
(
n+1
n+2
)
.
Observe that it will not be necessary when we describe equilibria to specify how
much effort players exert (e∗1 and e∗2): since, if we know the values players hold (θ∗1 and
θ∗2) and whether they interact (G(x∗1, x∗2)), Lemma 1 allows us to deduce e∗1 and e∗2.
Values
In equilibrium, players only value activities when their achievement is above aver-
age. It is optimal for them to value activities when their achievement is above average:
since that boosts self-esteem. Correspondingly, it is not optimal for them to value activ-
ities when their achievement is below average: since that lowers self-esteem.
Players value at most one activity in equilibrium: they may or may not value the
activities on which they focus their effort; they never value the activities on which they
are not focused since their achievement at those activities is always below average. We
will refer to players who value academics as “scholars” and players who value music as
“musicians.”
Lemma 2. In equilibrium:
(1) Players value activities (θ∗is = 1) if and only if their achievement is above average (a∗is −
a∗s > 0).
(2) Players value at most one activity.
Esteem
Self-esteem is always positive in equilibrium (Eii ≥ 0), since players are above av-
erage at activities they value. Players’ esteem for one another, on the other hand, may
be positive or negative. When players hold the same values (θ∗1 = θ∗2), they positively
esteem one another (Eji ≥ 0). In fact, esteem judgments exactly coincide (E1i = E2i ).
When players hold different values (θ∗1 ̸= θ∗2), achievement is below average at activities
valued by the other player. So, players negatively esteem one another (Eji ≤ 0). This
means that players who value academics will look down on players who value music
(and vice-versa). The following lemma gives more detail.
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Lemma 3. In equilibrium:
(1) Players have positive self-esteem (Eii ≥ 0). Players have strictly positive self-esteem
(Eii > 0) when they value academics or music.
(2) Players positively esteem one another (Eji ≥ 0) when they hold the same values (θ∗1 = θ∗2).
Their esteem judgments also coincide (E1i = E2i ). They have strictly positive esteem for
one another when, additionally, they value academics or music.
(3) Players negatively esteem one another (Eji ≤ 0) when they hold different values (θ∗1 ̸= θ∗2).
Interaction
When both players value academics or when both players value music, they posi-
tively esteem one another and are therefore inclined to interact. If there is a positive but
negligible cost of initiating interaction (k = 0+), they will interact in equilibrium. On the
other hand, when one player values academics and the other values music, they will be
disinclined to interact. If there is a positive but negligible cost of initiating interaction,
they will not interact in equilibrium. The following lemma summarizes.
Lemma 4. Suppose there is a positive but negligible cost of initiating interaction (k = 0+). If
both players value academics or both value music (θ∗i1 = θ∗j1 = 1 or θ∗i2 = θ∗j2 = 1), they will
interact in equilibrium (G(x∗1, x∗2) = 1). If one player values academics and the other values
music (θ∗i1 = 1 and θ∗j2 = 1), they will not interact in equilibrium (G(x∗1, x∗2) = 0).
More generally, there is a tendency for players with the same values to interact: since
they positively esteem one another. Whether players interact will also be governed,
though, by the cost of interaction (k).
2.4 Equilibria and Comparative Statics
We will now characterize the equilibria of the game and consider the model’s compara-
tive statics.
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2.4.1 Negligible Cost of Interaction (k = 0+)
First, we will consider the case in which there is a negligible cost of initiating interaction
(k = 0+). We will later examine the more general case, in which the cost of initiating
interaction (k) may be positive or negative.
Before describing the results, let us develop some intuition. As mentioned in the
introduction, there is a basic tension in the model: between players’ desire to conform,
on the one hand, and players’ desire to differentiate, on the other. To illustrate, suppose
the first player chooses to become a scholar. The first player’s choice might incline the
second player to conform and become a scholar as well: since doing so would earn him
more esteem from the first player. However, the first player’s choice might disincline
the second player to focus on academics: since it is harder to obtain self-esteem at an
activity on which others are focused. More generally, concern about self-esteem drives
players to differentiate; concern about receiving peer esteem drives players to conform.
The results are driven by this tension. In particular, players are relatively willing to
conform when they possess similar ability. But, when one player’s ability far exceeds
the other’s, there is a strong temptation on the part of the less able player to differentiate.
Proposition 1 characterizes the set of equilibria. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibria that
arise as a function of the players’ abilities (α1 and α2) for a representative case in which
n = 4.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is a positive but negligible cost of initiating interaction: k = 0+.
And suppose, without loss of generality, player 2 is more able than player 1 at academics (α2 ≥
α1).
(1) When the players have low academic ability, equilibria exist in which both are musicians
and interact. More specifically, existence requires: α22 ≤ 4( nn+1) and α21 < 4(n−1n+1).
(2) When the players have high academic ability and their academic abilities do not differ too
much, equilibria exist in which both are scholars and interact. More specifically, existence
requires: 2α
2
1
n+1 +
1
4 < α
2
2 <
3
4(n+ 1)α
2
1, and α22 ≤ (n+ 1)(α21 − 14).
(3) When player 2 has relatively high academic ability and player 1 has relatively low academic
ability, an equilibrium exists in which player 1 is a musician, player 2 is a scholar, and they
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do not interact. More specifically, existence requires: α22 ≥ max
(
4n
n+1 , (n+ 1)(α
2
1 − 14)
)
.
(4) When n = 0 and α21 ≥ α22 − 14 , an equilibrium exists in which player 1 is a scholar, player
2 is a musician, and they do not interact.
Player 1 - Musician,
Player 2 - Scholar/
No Interaction
Both Scholars/
Interaction
Player 1 - Scholar,
Player 2 - Musician/
No InteractionBoth Musicians/
Interaction
0 2 4 6 8
0
2
4
6
8
Α1
Α2
Figure 1 – Players’ equilibrium behavior. (Blank spaces are regions where equilibria
do not exist; the dotted line is used in the discussion of comparative statics.)
We see in Figure 1 that if one player is considerably more able than the other at aca-
demics, the more able player becomes a scholar, the less able player becomes a musician,
and they do not interact. If, on the other hand, the players possess similar ability (α1
close to α2), they focus on and value the same activity. If both have high academic abil-
ity, they become scholars and interact. If both have low academic ability, they become
musicians and interact. If both have intermediate ability, they either become scholars
or musicians and interact. Either is an equilibrium in this case, because of the players’
desire to conform to one another.
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Several observations are worth making. First, equilibria exist in which a player who
is more able at academics than music (αi > 1) nonetheless becomes a musician out of a
desire to differentiate from the other player, who is a scholar.
Second, equilibria arise in which both players are superior at academics (α1,α2 > 1)
but both, nonetheless, become musicians. In such equilibria, each player chooses to
become a musician out of a desire to conform to the other. We also see equilibria in
which both players become academics despite superior musical ability.
Third, multiple values can arise. More specifically, for some (α1,α2) pairs, equilibria
exist in which both players value academics and equilibria exist in which both players
value music. These values almost always differ in the welfare they give to players. If
the players aremore able at academics (music), they are both better off in the equilibrium
in which academics (music) is valued.
Finally, it should be noted that two cases covered by Proposition 1 – the n = 0 and
n = 1 cases – look different from Figure 1. The players’ have a strong desire to differ-
entiate from one another when the population is small. As a result, when n = 0 or 1,
players always differentiate in equilibrium. Furthermore, when n = 0, the desire to dif-
ferentiate is sufficiently intense that equilibria arise in which the player who is more able
at academics becomes a musician while the player who is less able becomes a scholar.
Comparative Statics
What is the effect in the model of a change in one of the player’s abilities? The dotted
line in Figure 1 shows the effect of a change in the first player’s academic ability (α1) on
the equilibrium. Player 2 is a scholar when α1 is low, while player 1 is a musician.
An increase in α1 from a low level to an intermediate level causes player 1 to become a
scholar as well. With α1 in this intermediate range, players interact and share the same
values. If α1 increases further, however, player 2 switches from scholar to musician
since he finds it hard to compete against player 1.
Figure 2 shows how players’ effort and achievement at academics change with α1
along Figure 1’s dotted line.12 Player 1’s effort and achievement at academics are in-
creasing in his ability with one exception: both drop discontinuously when player 2
12Recall that we can deduce players’ effort and achievement from Lemma 1.
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Figure 2 – How players’ effort and achievement change with α1 (along Figure 1’s
dotted line).
becomes a musician. Player 2 exerts some effort at academics when α1 is low (since he
is a scholar); he exerts more effort at academics when α1 is in the intermediate range
(since, additionally, he has a peer who is a scholar); he exerts no effort at academics
when α1 is high (since he is a musician).13 His academic achievement, in consequence,
is increasing in his peer’s ability when α1 is low and decreasing in his peer’s ability
when α1 is high.
This nonmonotonicity can be understood in terms of the competing desires to con-
form and differentiate. Achievement is increasing in peer ability when α1 is low because
13A natural question is why, in Figure 2, player 2’s effort at academics is constant in the middle interval.
Wemight expect player 2’s effort to rise over the interval, as player 1’s academic achievement rises. Player
2’s effort would be rising over the interval if Ui were a concave function of Ei. However, when Ui
is a linear function of Ei, as we have assumed for simplicity, the marginal esteem returns to effort at
academics (Mi1) do not depend upon the other player’s academic achievement (see Lemma 1), which
results in constant effort over the interval.
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the desire to conform dominates, while achievement is decreasing in peer ability when
α1 is high because the desire to differentiate dominates.
1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.350.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
Α1
E11
Player 1's Self Esteem
Figure 3 – How player 1’s self-esteem (E11 ) changes with α1 along Figure 1’s dotted
line (in the region where player 1 switches from music to academics).
Perhaps contrary to intuition, self-esteem is non-monotonic in own ability. Figure 3
illustrates. It shows player 1’s self-esteem (E11 ) along Figure 1’s dotted line, focusing on
the region in which player 1 switches from music to academics. We see that self-esteem
initially drops when player 1 switches from music to academics, even though his ability
increases. The reason for this drop is that player 1 is willing to sacrifice self-esteem
because he receives something else in return: more esteem from his peer.
2.4.2 Positive or Negative Cost of Interaction
We turn now to the general case, in which the cost of initiating interaction (k) may be
positive or negative. The general case allows us additionally to consider compara-
tive statics in k (i.e., the consequences of encouraging/discouraging interaction between
players).
Once again, the results are driven by players’ competing desires to conform and dif-
ferentiate. When k is high, players will not interact, and thus will be unconcerned about
receiving the other player’s esteem. They will, in consequence, be inclined to differenti-
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ate. When k is low, they will interact, and will therefore be more inclined to conform.14
As we will see presently, the result is that encouraging interaction (decreasing k) makes
it more likely players will focus on and value the same activities.
The analysis is divided into three cases. First, we will characterize the equilibria
when one of the players has high academic ability; then, we will characterize the equi-
libria when one of the players has low academic ability; finally, we will consider the case
in which both players have intermediate ability.
Case 1. One of the players has high academic ability.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibria when one of the players – without loss of
generality, player 2 – has high academic ability (α2 > αH). Player 2 will always be
a scholar. The behavior of player 1 depends upon α1 and k. Figure 4 illustrates the
equilibrium behavior of player 1 as a function of α1 and k for a representative case (in
which α2 = 3 and n = 2).
Proposition 2. Suppose, without loss of generality, player 2 is more able than player 1 at aca-
demics (α2 ≥ α1) and suppose αH is defined as follows:
αH =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
√
4n
n+1 , if n > 2√
3, if n = 2
∞, if n < 2
.
If α2 > αH , player 2 will always be a scholar in equilibrium. If, additionally,
(1) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k1) and player 1’s academic ability is
sufficiently low (α21 ≤ 1 + 2(n+1)α22): equilibria exist in which the players do not interact
and player 1 is a musician.
14The preceding intuition can be stated more formally, as follows. Consider a modification of the
two-player game of this paper in which players do not choose whether to initiate interaction: instead
x1 and x2 are exogenously given. (1) If the players do not interact (G(x1, x2) = 0), the game exhibits
strategic substitutability. (2) If the players do interact (G(x1, x2) = 1), the game does not exhibit strategic
substitutability; in the limit as the size of the background population n → ∞, the game exhibits strategic
complementarity. The game exhibits strategic complementarity in the limit because players’ desire to
differentiate from one another decreases as the population size increases.
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(2) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k2) and player 1’s academic ability is
sufficiently high (α21 ≥ 1 + 2(n+1)α22): equilibria exist in which the players do not interact
and player 1 is a scholar.
(3) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ 0) and player 1’s academic ability is suffi-
ciently low (α21 ≤ 14 + 12(n+1)α22, α1 < 1): equilibria exist in which the players interact and
player 1 is a musician.
(4) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ k3) and player 1’s academic ability is
sufficiently high (α21 ≥ 14 + 1n+1α22, α21 > 43(n+1)α22): equilibria exist in which the players
interact and player 1 is a scholar.
(5) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ 0) and player 1’s academic ability is in an
intermediate range (1 < α21 < 23(n+1)α
2
2): equilibria exist in which the players interact and
player 1 focuses on but does not value academics.
where:
k1 =
1
2
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max
(
4α21 − 4n+1α22 − 1,− 2n+1
)
,
k2 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2 (3
2α
2
2 − 1n+1α21
)
,
k3 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
min
(
3
2α
2
2 − 2n+1α21, 2α22 − 12 − 4n+1α21
)
.
We see in Figure 4, as one might expect, that the players do not interact when it
is costly to do so (k is high); they do interact when it is not costly (k is low). Player 1
becomes a musician when his academic ability is low (α1 low); and he becomes a scholar
when his academic ability is high (α1 high). When k is low – so that the players interact
– and player 1’s ability is in an intermediate range, player 1 exerts effort at academics
so player 2 will esteem him more highly. However, he chooses not to value academics,
since his achievement is below average.
Comparative Statics
The four dotted lines in Figure 4 represent the possible consequences of encouraging
interaction (decreasing k). If player 1’s academic ability is sufficiently low, player 1 will
be a musician regardless (see the first dotted line). Encouraging interaction has no effect
on the behavior of either player.
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Figure 4 – Player 1’s equilibrium behavior. (Blank spaces are regions where equilib-
ria do not exist; the dotted lines are used in the discussion of comparative statics.)
If player 1’s academic ability is slightly higher (the second dotted line), player 1 will
choose to focus on academics – rather than become a musician – when interaction takes
place. But, player 1 chooses not to value academics, since his achievement is below
average.
If player 1’s academic ability is higher still (the third dotted line), player 1 switches
from being a musician to a scholar when interaction takes place. Interaction causes
player 1 to value academics as well as focus on it, in contrast to the second dotted line.
Player 2 is also affected by interaction in this case: he exerts more effort at academics,
motivated as he is by the desire to be highly esteemed by his peer (who also values
20
academics).15,16
Finally, if player 1’s academic ability is sufficiently high (the fourth dotted line), both
players will be scholars regardless of whether they interact. But, interaction does affect
players’ effort. Both exert more effort at academics: since they are motivated by a desire
to obtain the other player’s esteem.
Case 2. One of the players has low academic ability.
Proposition 3 characterizes the equilibria when one of the players – without loss of
generality, player 1 – has low academic ability (α1 < αL). This case closely mirrors the
first. Player 1 will always be a musician. The behavior of player 2 depends upon α2 and
k. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium behavior of player 2 as a function of α2 and k for
a representative case (in which α1 = 14 and n = 2).
Proposition 3. Suppose, without loss of generality, player 2 is more able than player 1 at aca-
demics (α2 ≥ α1) and suppose αL is defined as follows:
αL =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
√
n+1
4n , if n > 2√
1
3 , if n = 2
0, if n < 2
.
If α1 < αL, player 1 will always be a musician in equilibrium. If, additionally,
(1) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k1) and player 2’s academic ability is
sufficiently low (α22 ≤ n−1n+1 ): equilibria exist in which the players do not interact and
player 2 is a musician.
(2) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k2) and player 2’s academic ability is
sufficiently high (α22 ≥ n−1n+1 ): equilibria exist in which the players do not interact and
player 2 is a scholar.
15According to Lemma 1, when the players do not interact, player 2 exerts effort
(
n+1
n+2
)
α2 at academics
and his achievement is
(
n+1
n+2
)
α22; when the players do interact, player 2 exerts effort 2
(
n+1
n+2
)
α2 at aca-
demics and his achievement is 2
(
n+1
n+2
)
α22.
16Goffman (1959) would call this a form of “presentation of self.” One contribution of this paper is to
capture such motivation and show some of its consequences.
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(3) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ k3) and player 2’s academic ability is
sufficiently low (α22 ≤ 4nn+1): equilibria exist in which the players interact and player 2 is a
musician.
(4) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ 0) and player 2’s academic ability is suffi-
ciently high (α22 ≥ 4 − 2n+1 ): equilibria exist in which the players interact and player 2 is
a scholar.
where:
k1 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max
(
3
2 − 1n+1 , 12α22 − 12
)
,
k2 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max
(
− 1n+1 , 2nn+1 − 12α22, 2α21 − 12 − 2α
2
2
n+1
)
,
k3 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
min
(
3
2 − 2n+1 , 2
(
n−1
n+1
)− 12α21) .
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Figure 5 – Player 2’s equilibrium behavior. (Blank spaces are regions where equilib-
ria do not exist; the dotted line is used in the discussion of comparative statics.)
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We see in Figure 5 that the comparative statics are similar to those in the first case.
In the first case, interaction made it more likely player 1 would focus on and value
academics. In this case, interaction makes it more likely player 2 will focus on and
valuemusic. The dotted line in Figure 5 shows that interaction causes player 2 to switch
from a scholar to a musician when he has intermediate academic ability.
The one (small) difference between this case and the previous is that no equilibria
arise in which player 2 focuses on an activity but does not value it. The reason for this
difference is that, in contrast to academics, the players have the same musical ability.17
Case 3. Both players have intermediate academic ability.
When both players’ abilities are in an intermediate range (αL ≤ α1,α2 ≤ αH), it is not
possible to draw a representative picture – in two dimensions – of the equilibrium set as
we did for the previous two cases. However, we can still characterize the equilibria (see
Proposition 4 below) and examine the model’s comparative statics. Importantly, as in
the previous two cases, encouraging interaction makes it more likely players will focus
on and value the same activities. This is stated formally in Lemma 5.
Proposition 4. Suppose, without loss of generality, player 2 is more able than player 1 at aca-
demics (α2 ≥ α1). Suppose further that αL ≤ α1,α2 ≤ αH . If, additionally,
(1) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k1), and the players have high – and similar
– academic ability (α21 ≥ 1 + 2n+1α22): an equilibrium exists in which the players do not
interact and both are scholars.
(2) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k2) and the players’ academic ability is
low (α22 ≤ n−1n+1 ): an equilibrium exists in which the players do not interact and both are
musicians.
(3) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k3, k > k4) and player 2’s academic ability
is sufficiently high relative to player 1’s (α22 ≥ max(n−1n+1 , n+12 (α21 − 1))): an equilibrium
exists in which the players do not interact, player 1 is a musician, and player 2 is a scholar.
17The logic is simple. Because the players have identical musical ability, they will have the same level
of achievement whenever they both focus onmusic. It follows that player 2 will always value music when
he focuses on it – since his achievement will never be below average.
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(4) The cost of interacting is sufficiently high (k ≥ k5) and the players both have an inter-
mediate level of academic ability (α21 ≥ max(n−1n+1 , n+12 (α22 − 1))): an equilibrium exists in
which the players do not interact, player 1 is a scholar, and player 2 is a musician.
(5) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ k6), the players have high – and similar –
academic ability (α21 ≥ 14 + 1n+1α22, α21 > 43(n+1)α22), and n ≥ 1: equilibria exist in which
the players interact and both are scholars.
(6) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ k7), the players have low academic abil-
ity (α22 ≤ 4nn+1 ), and n ≥ 1: equilibria exist in which the players interact and both are
musicians.
Two additional types of equilibria exist when n ≤ 1. If:
(7) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ 0), player 2’s academic ability is sufficiently
high relative to player 1’s (α22 ≥ max
(
4n+2
n+1 , (n+ 1)
(
2α21 − 12
))
), and player 1 has low
academic ability (α21 < 1): equilibria exist in which the players interact, player 1 is a
musician, and player 2 is a scholar.
(8) The cost of interacting is sufficiently low (k ≤ 0), player 2’s academic ability is sufficiently
high relative to player 1’s (α22 ≥ max(32(n + 1)α21, 1 + 2n+1α21)), and player 1 has high
academic ability (α21 > 1): equilibria exist in which the players interact, player 1 focuses
on but does not value academics, and player 2 is a scholar.
where:
k1 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max(32α
2
2 − 1n+1α21, 12 − 12α21),
k2 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2 (3
2 − 1n+1
)
,
k3 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max
(
2n
n+1 − 12α22, 2α21 − 2n+1α22 − 12 , −1n+1
)
,
k4 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2 (1
2α
2
1 − 1n+1α22 − 12
)
,
k5 =
(
n+1
n+2
)2
max( 2nn+1 − 12α21, 2α22 − 2n+1α21 − 12 , −1n+1),
k6 = max
(
0,
(
n+1
n+2
)2
min
(
3
2α
2
2 − 2n+1α21, 2α22 − 4n+1α21 − 12
))
,
k7 = max(0,
(
n+1
n+2
)2
min
(
2
(
n−1
n+1
)− 12α21, 32 − 2n+1) .
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Lemma 5. Hold α1 and α2 fixed. Suppose a decline in k causes the players to move from an
equilibrium in which they were not interacting (equilibrium 1) to an equilibrium in which they
do interact (equilibrium 2). Such a decline in k makes it more likely that the players will focus
on the same activity and will hold the same values. More specifically, if players do not focus on
the same activity (hold the same values) in equilibrium 2, they definitely do not focus on the same
activity (hold the same values) in equilibrium 1.
3 An Extension: Many Players
This section shows how the model can be extended to allow for more than two play-
ers and more than two activities. It also characterizes the equilibria for a simple case.
In contrast to the baseline model, in which there was a background population whose
actions were fixed, the behavior of the entire population is determined endogenously.
Assume there is a continuum of players (i ∈ [0, 1]). As before, players make three
choices: (1) effort atM activities (eis ≥ 0), (2) whether to value achievement at activities
(θis ∈ {0, 1}), and (3) whether to initiate interaction (xji ∈ {0, 1}, j ̸= i). xji denotes player
i’s choice whether to initiate interaction with player j; players interact if either initiates
it. Player i’s achievement at activity s (ais) depends upon his effort and ability (αis):
ais = αis · eis, where αis ≥ 0.
The players have the following utility function, the terms of which are analogous to
those in the baseline model:
Ui = −1
2
(
M∑
s=1
eis
)2
− kxi + Ei.
The first term is the cost of effort. The second term is the cost of initiating interaction,
where xi denotes the share of the population with whom player i initiates interaction.
The final term is esteem utility. To simplify analysis, we assume players prefer not to
exert effort at activities or value activities when they are otherwise indifferent.
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Esteem utility is given by:
Ei = βE
i
i +
∫
j ̸=i
G(xji , x
i
j) · Eji dj,
whereG(xji , xij) = 1 if interaction takes place between players i and j (if x
j
i or xij = 1) and
G(xji , x
i
j) = 0 otherwise. The first term reflects player i’s concern about self-esteem (Eii ).
The second term reflects player i’s concern about peer esteem (Eji ). We parameterize the
weight players put on self-esteem by β (this will allow us to examine how concern about
self-esteem affects the size of groups). As before, the esteem player i grants a player l –
l may refer to himself or another player – is given by: Eil =
∑M
s=1 θis(als − as), where as
denotes the average achievement of the whole population at activity s.
Again, we will focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Equilibria
As in the baseline model, there is a tension between players’ desire to conform and
players’ desire to differentiate. Equilibria resolve this tension. We will characterize the
equilibria for a simple case, in which players have ability of 1 at all activities (αis = 1 for
all i and s) and the cost of initiating interaction is negligible (k = 0+).18
Lemma 6 relates three properties of equilibria.
Lemma 6. Suppose players have ability of 1 at all activities and there is a positive but negligible
cost of initiating interaction. Then, equilibria have the following properties:
(1) Players value one activity in equilibrium (except perhaps a set of players of measure zero).
(2) Players interact with all those who share their values (except perhaps a set of measure zero)
and no players with different values.
(3) Players who value activity s exert effort λs + β at activity s, where λs denotes the fraction
of players who value activity s; they exert zero effort at other activities; and they receive
utility
(
1
2 − λs
)
(λs + β)2.
18When players have heterogeneous ability, fully characterizing the equilibria is quite involved. Hence,
doing so is beyond the scope of the paper.
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According to Lemma 6, players form interaction groups according to their values.
Proposition 5 characterizes the equilibria in which those groups are of equal size.19
Proposition 5. Suppose players have ability of 1 at all activities and there is a positive but
negligible cost of initiating interaction. The following is a characterization of the equilibria in
which all groups are of equal size.
(1) Equilibria exist in which the players divide intoM groups, each of size 1M .
(2) If β < 1 and m < m < M : equilibria exist in which the players divide into m groups,
each of size 1m . m solves:
(
1
2 − 1m
)
( 1m + β)
2 = 12β
2.
According to Proposition 5, players either divide across all M activities in equilib-
rium or across a subset of size m > m. As concern about self-esteem (β) increases, m
increases. In this sense, the equilibrium number of groups is rising in β and the equilib-
rium size of groups is falling in β. This result is intuitive since players have a stronger
desire to differentiate when they care more about self-esteem.
The group size that maximizes players’ utility is: λ∗ = max
(
1−β
3 ,
1
M
)
. As one would
expect, the optimal group size is decreasing in β since concern about self-esteem makes
players more inclined to differentiate. It follows from Proposition 5 that the equilibrium
group size may be larger than or smaller than the optimum (λ∗). The prediction that
groups may be suboptimally large is quite robust; the prediction that groups may be
suboptimally small is less robust. This finding depends upon players having zero mass.
If players had non-zeromass, theywould deviate to form larger groupswhen the groups
are suboptimally small. Hence, these equilibria disappear under a suitable equilibrium
refinement.
4 Applications
This section highlights a number of environments where the theory explains observed
patterns.
19There can be at most two group sizes in equilibrium. Suppose one group is of size λ. This group gives
members utility U =
(
1
2 − λ
)
(λ+ β)2. In equilibrium, all groups must yield the same utility: otherwise,
players switch groups. Observe that there is at most one other value of λ that yields U.
27
Schools
The model is consistent with a variety of findings about schools. One of the classics
in the sociology of education is James Coleman’s (1961) Adolescent Society. Coleman’s
study, based upon research conducted in ten Illinois schools, provides strong evidence
that students face a conflict between conforming and differentiating. More recent stud-
ies such as Milner (2004) and Crosnoe (2011) – appropriately titled Fitting in, Stand-
ing Out – also stress the importance of such a conflict. Using questionnaires, Coleman
looked at the self-esteem of students. As one might expect, students in the “leading
crowd” had high self-esteem. Students distant from the leading crowd, it turns out,
also had high self-esteem. The students in the middle, who were associated with, but
not solidly members of, the leading crowd, had the lowest self-esteem.20
Coleman’s explanation for this pattern is in line with the model. He argues that stu-
dents distant from the leading crowd restore self-esteem by adopting different values.21
In keeping with this view, he finds that only a small fraction of students distant from the
leading crowd want to be part of it (in senior year, just 12 percent). Students in the mid-
dle – who conform to the leading crowd’s values but receive only limited acceptance –
are willing to suffer low self-esteem, he argues, because they receive, in exchange, more
esteem/status within the school as a whole. Observe that Figure 3 looks just like Cole-
man’s findings if we think of α as ability to fit into the leading crowd: high-α types
in Figure 3 are the leading crowd; low-α types are the students distant from the lead-
ing crowd; those in the middle, with the lowest self-esteem, are the hangers-on to the
leading crowd.
The model predicts that student achievement is increasing (decreasing) in peer abil-
ity when peer ability is low (high). This prediction reconciles empirical findings about
peer effects in schools. Many studies report large, positive effects of having peers with
higher academic ability. For instance, looking at a large matched panel of third-to-sixth
graders in Texas public schools, Hanushek et al. (2003) find that a one standard deviation
increase in average peer test score leads to a 0.20 standard deviation increase in own test
score. But a significant minority of studies, instead, report negative effects. Carrell et
20Coleman measured self-esteem by asking students whether they would prefer to be someone else.
21Coleman writes: “Rather than continuing to hold a negative image about himself, the adoles-
cent. . .will focus his interest on [activities] where he can feel good about himself.”
28
al. (2013), for example, find negative peer effects in an experiment conducted at the US
Air Force Academy. Some students were put into squadrons that were positively sorted
by academic ability while others were put into squadrons that were negatively sorted.
The lowest ability students – those in the bottom third – performed worse under neg-
ative assortment (i.e., when they had more able peers). Their GPAs were 0.061 points
lower. Carrell et al. (2013) also examined social interactions within squadrons: look-
ing, specifically, at friendships, roommate selection, and choice of study partners. In
keeping with the model’s predictions (see Figure 1), students avoided interaction with
peers of different ability. The negatively selected squadrons divided into homogeneous
subgroups.22
Finally, an important finding of the education literature is that, while public schools
are somewhat comparable to Catholic schools in educating students at the top, Catholic
schools have greater success with students at the bottom (see Powell et al. (1985)’s Shop-
ping Mall High School). Altonji et al. (2005), for instance, find that attending a Catholic
school rather than a public school substantially decreases the chance of dropout (by
at least five percentage points). The cohesiveness of the Catholic schools relative to
the public schools is a frequently cited reason for their success (see especially Bryk et
al. (1993), Lesko (1988), and Coleman et al. (1982)). This difference is due, in signifi-
cant measure, to public schools’ greater permissiveness in choice of curriculum. Such
choice allows the best students to separate themselves out (for example, into AP pro-
22Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) report results similar to those of Carrell et al. (2013). They find that the
worst students (those in the bottom decile) benefit more from having additional mediocre peers (peers in
the 15th percentile) than they do from having additional high ability peers (peers in the 85th percentile).
A ten percentage point increase in the share of peers scoring in the 15th percentile generates 4.5 more test
points than the same size increase in the share of peers in the 85th percentile. 4.5 test points translates to
0.185 standard deviations: a substantial difference.
Other studies that have found negative peer effects include: Kling et al. (2005, 2007), who study the
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment; Cicala et al. (2011), who examine evidence from the New
York Public Schools; and Lavy et al. (2012), who look at data on English secondary school students. Some
studies, such as Kling et al. (2005, 2007), find negative peer effects for boys and positive peer effects for
girls. The model suggests two possible explanations for these gender differences. The first explanation
is that there may be differences between men and women in the economic part of the utility function.
For instance, in the MTO experiment, the girls might be more attached to the labor force than the boys
because of a need – or expected need – to support children. The second explanation is that there may
be a difference between men and women in the non-economic part of the utility function. In particular,
males may care more about self-esteem while women may care more about obtaining esteem from peers.
Some social scientists, such as Gilligan (1982), Maccoby (1990), and Giordano (2003), have postulated the
existence of such a difference.
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grams). Bryk et al. (1993) construct 23 separate measures of cohesiveness, all of which
are greater for the Catholic schools.23 Cohesiveness, it is argued, makes students at the
bottom more academically oriented, and hence less inclined to drop out. The model
captures this story. We can think of Catholic schools as an environment where students
of differing ability are forced to interact. As we saw in Figure 4, the performance of
those at the bottom (low-α types) may improve when they are forced to interact with
those at the top (high-α types).24
The Decline of Inner Cities
One of the foremost problems in the United States has been the economic and so-
cial decline of the inner city. Many statistics are indicators: low rates of young male
employment; high incarceration rates; and high incidence of out-of-wedlock births and
single-parent households.
The leading explanation, given by William Julius Wilson, emphasizes the role of cul-
tural change (see Wilson (1997, 2009)).25 In Wilson’s view, the decline of the inner city
was primarily brought about by two shocks. One shock was deindustrialization, which
began in the late 1960s. Manufacturing had been a locus of jobs especially well-suited
23For example, Bryk et al. (1993) find that there is a higher likelihood in Catholic schools of a teacher
knowing a given student; they also find that a greater fraction of students participate in extracurricular
activities.
24Another strand of the education literature concerns the effects of tracking. A potential reason for
tracking is that it allows teachers to tailor the curriculum to student abilities. But, there are also peer
effects associated with tracking. For example, Kulik and Kulik (1992) suggest that being put in a low track
allows low-ability students to avoid comparing themselves to more able peers, and therefore enhances
their self-esteem. Thus, Kulik and Kulik (1992) believe tracking may increase the motivation of low-
ability students. Other scholars (see Oakes (1985)) worry that a low track reduces student self-esteem,
and as a result, decreases their motivation.
These competing peer effects can be understood in terms of the model. Kulik and Kulik’s point corre-
sponds to the potential positive effect on academic achievement in the model of having a less able peer
(see Figure 2). Oakes’ argument can be understood in an extension to the model, in which players have
imperfect information about their relative achievement. In such an extension, receiving a negative signal
about one’s relative academic achievement could cause a decline in academic performance. Oakes’ point
is that being put in a low track might serve as just such a negative signal.
A recent experiment on tracking by Duflo et al. (2011), conducted in Kenya, finds positive effects of
tracking for students in all quantiles.
25Other scholars who emphasize the role of culture include Anderson (1999), Massey and Denton
(1993), Waters (1999), Patterson (2000), Wacquant (2008), Harding (2010), and Harding et al. (2010). Loury
(1998, 1999) also argues that economists need to incorporate values and social interactions into their anal-
ysis of the inner city.
30
for the low skilled, but willing-to-work. The other shock was middle-class flight: in
the 1970s, significant numbers of middle-class African Americans left the inner city, as
reduced discrimination made flight to the suburbs possible.
The resultant concentration of joblessness, in Wilson’s view, led to the emergence
of a street culture, in opposition to mainstream values. This street culture allowed
marginalized inner-city residents to retain a modicum of dignity; however, it further
blocked opportunities.26 In Wilson’s survey of 190 Chicago-area employers, for exam-
ple, many indicate pessimism about the work ethic of inner-city workers and express a
reluctance to hire them. Some even throw applications out solely on the basis of inner-
city addresses.27,28
The model captures Wilson’s story. Think of activity 1 in the model as working and
activity 2 as street-related activity. Deindustrialization is like a negative shock to α (abil-
ity to work). As we see in Figure 1, a reduction in α can cause a player to shift from an
activity-1 (work) orientation to an activity-2 (street) orientation.29 Middle-class flight is
like a shock to k since it cuts off interaction between inner-city residents and the middle
class. As we see in Figure 4, an increase in k that keeps a player from interacting with
a high-α peer can induce a switch from an activity-1 (work) orientation to an activity-2
(street) orientation.
26Ethnographies show that motivations in the inner city comport with Wilson’s story. See especially
Bourgois (1996), Anderson (1999), Venkatesh (2006), and Liebow (1967)).
27Waters (1999) finds that, among inner city residents, employers have a preference for hiring recent
West Indian immigrants, whose values are less oppositional. In consequence, West Indian immigrants
have a significantly higher rate of labor force participation. According to Waters, as West Indian immi-
grants assimilate, their differences relative to other inner city residents diminish: “Many of the children
of the immigrants develop ‘oppositional identities’....The cultural behaviors associated with these oppo-
sitional identities. . . erode the life chances of the children of the West Indian immigrants.”
28As additional evidence of a cultural shift, Fryer and Levitt (2004) have found that, in the early 1960s,
there was little difference between the types of names chosen by African Americans and whites for their
children. But, a major shift took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The median African-American
female in a segregated neighborhood in California went from receiving a name that was twice as likely to
be given to African Americans as whites to receiving a name that was twenty times as likely to be given to
African Americans as whites. At the same time, a subset of African Americans, comprising roughly one
quarter of all African Americans and one half of African Americans living in predominantly white areas,
moved towards names that were more white than those they had chosen previously. This latter finding
suggests a cultural shift – in the opposite direction – among middle-class African Americans.
29A key assumption here is that inner-city residents compare themselves to people outside the inner
city who are less affected by deindustrialization. If inner-city residents compared themselves only to
other inner-city residents, it is not clear that deindustrialization would have brought about a significant
shift in values.
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The model predicts that, when some inner-city residents shift to a street orientation,
they will start to look down on those who maintain a work orientation; they will put
pressure on those residents to shift to a street orientation as well. Numerous scholars
have described the existence of such pressure. In particular, Fordham and Ogbu (1986)
describe the use of the term “acting white” as a pejorative.30 Students who perform too
well in school, for example, are so derided.31 Also in line with this prediction of the
model, Furstenberg et al. (1999) find that many parents deliberately practice a strategy
of social isolation in order to keep their kids away from negative influences. On the
flip side, Newman (1999)’s study of workers at “Burger Barn” in Harlem examines the
power of positive social influences. She describes, for instance, how Kyesha, when she
first went to work at Burger Barn, was a poorly-performing sophomore in high school
leaning towards a street orientation. Like themajority of her friends, she was at high risk
of dropping out. Kyesha pulled away from her high school friends, though, as Burger
Barn became the center of her social life. She ended up graduating (with a respectable
average no less).
Resistance
Robert Ramsay (1966)’s study of the merchant marines describes crewmen’s intense
anger at ship’s officers and the numerous ways in which they resisted officers’ orders.
For instance: the catering staff would “heave a whole pile of dirty dishes through an
open port-hole instead of washing them”32; crewmen would intentionally foul up tanks
while cleaning them; stewards in charge of personal laundry would burn through shirts
with an iron “by mistake”; and deck crews would “take a malicious delight” in painting
over oil and water.
What incensed the crew might seem minor. For example, Ramsay describes their
anger when a broken coffee percolator was replaced with an old one in poor repair,
retired from the officers’ saloon. In Ramsay’s view, the percolator was a serious issue
rather than a minor one because of what it symbolized: “what enraged the crewmen
was the knowledge that in the minds of those responsible [they] weren’t even worth a
30See also Carter (2005), who tells a similar story in Keepin’ It Real.
31Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) construct amodel of “actingwhite” in which some students obtain less
education in order to signal loyalty to their peers. The mechanism they describe is somewhat different.
32Ramsay (1966), p. 123.
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cup of coffee.”33 In other words, the crew’s anger and resistance stemmed from being
denied the esteem they felt was due. In terms of the model, Eii (the crew’s self-esteem)
exceeded Eji (the officers’ esteem for them).
Workplace resistance has received relatively little attention in economics, but it is
a major theme in sociology and is seen as important for understanding organizational
dysfunction (for reviews, see Collinson and Ackroyd (2005) and Hodson (1995)). Forms
of resistance that have been studied include absenteeism (see Edwards (1986), Gould-
ner (1954)), pilfering (see Mars (1982), Westwood (1984)), sabotage (see Juravich (1985)),
and hazing (see Vallas (2006)).34,35 Scholars such as Hodson (1995, 2001) and Cavendish
(1982) argue that denial of esteem is one of the primary reasons workers engage in re-
sistance.36
The model explains why workers would feel they had been denied the esteem they
deserve (Eji < Eii ). In so doing, it accounts for the presence (or absence) of resistance
in numerous settings.37 For instance, the model not only explains why many in the
inner city adopt street orientations; it also explains why they then engage in resistance
in the workplace. Consider Philippe Bourgois (1996)’s study of Primo, a Harlem crack
dealer in the 1980s. In his early teens, Primowas work oriented, motivated to pursue the
“working-class dream of finding a. . . factory job and working hard for steady wages.”
When the garment industry left New York, though, Primo had difficulty making the
transition into the service sector. Primo’s response was to adopt a street orientation.
According to Bourgois, he made a “cultural redefinition [whereby] crack dealing and
unemployment [are] a badge of pride.” Primo occasionally took service sector jobs, but
33Op. cit., p. 99.
34Vallas (2006), for example, describes hazing at a paper mill, stemming from manual workers’ anger
at engineers, who accorded them low esteem. The manual workers taught a young engineer to press
a particular black button whenever the paper machine went down, knowing full well that the button
was not yet wired to the console. The manual workers “enjoyed the sight of this credentialed employee
desperately pushing a useless button – a scene that went on for a period of several weeks.”
35Some sociologists have used the term “resistance” to refer to shirking, which might be motivated by
economic considerations (see, for instance, Burawoy (1979)). Nonetheless, the term is normally used to
refer to behavior that is not purely economic in nature.
36Other scholars have stressed differences in values as a reason for resistance (see Scott (1985)). Observe
that, in the model, an agent i only feels he has been denied the esteem due to him by an agent j (Eji < Eii )
when agents i and j possess different values.
37It is important to note that anger-over-denial-of-esteem and the resistance such anger might bring
about are not explicitly modeled in the paper. However, one could imagine doing so as an extension.
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because of his street orientation, he received less respect from coworkers than he felt he
deserved (Eji < Eii ). This led him to engage in resistance. Bourgois describes how, in a
mailroom job, Primo enjoyed putting on a thick accent when answering the phone – just
to annoy his supervisor. More seriously, he pocketed money he had been given to mail
letters. His behavior, not surprisingly, quickly got him fired.
The model also explains resistance in schools, such as the misbehavior documented
by Willis (1977) in his study of “the lads” – a group of boys at a secondary school in the
EnglishMidlands. The lads’ working-class values stand in sharp contrast to the middle-
class values of the teachers and other students at the school (whom they pejoratively
refer to as “ear’oles”). While the teachers’ particularly stress the importance of academic
achievement, the lads emphasize the importance of masculinity. They look down on the
teachers, whom they consider effete. A consequence of their different values is that the
lads feel the teachers accord them too little respect (Eji < Eii ). The disrespect they
suffer provokes anger and resistance. They make it their aim to retaliate by defeating
the school’s “main perceived purpose: to make you ‘work.’”38 Fuzz (one of the lads)
tries to thwart the teachers by never writing a single word: “I writ ‘yes’ on a piece of
paper, that broke me heart.”39 During class, “there is a continuous scraping of chairs, a
bad tempered ‘tut-tutting’ at the simplest request.” Outside of class, too, the lads make
mischief. On one occasion, they steal a fire extinguisher from the school and set it off in
a local park. On another, they make a disturbance during a school assembly.
Thus, while resistance is a phenomenon largely overlooked by economists, it is of
considerable importance. The model accounts for its presence or absence.
5 Conclusion
Values play an important role in shaping behavior. But, how do they form and what
causes them to change? This paper addresses these questions. It presents a model in
which people choose their values. The choice is motivated by economic considerations
but, crucially, also by the desire for esteem. A tension exists for agents between a desire,
38Willis (1977), p. 26.
39Op. cit., p. 27.
34
on the one hand, to conform in the choice of values and a desire, on the other hand, to
differentiate. In conforming, an agent obtains more esteem from peers; in differentiat-
ing, an agent may obtain more self-esteem.
The model’s comparative statics are driven by this tension. Since agents care more
about conforming when they interact, encouraging interaction makes them more likely
to focus on – and value – the same activities. An increase in peer ability can have a
positive or negative effect on own achievement, depending upon whether the desire to
conform, or the desire to differentiate, dominates. We find that own achievement is
increasing in peer ability when peer ability is low and decreasing in peer ability when
peer ability is high.
The model describes a wide range of social phenomena. The model fits especially
well the motivation of students. It explains, for example, the success of Catholic schools
in preventing dropout and why studies have found both positive and negative peer ef-
fects. Themodel captures the role of culture in the decline of US inner cities. It especially
elucidates William Julius Wilson’s argument why deindustrialization and middle-class
flight would have caused inner-city residents to shift from a work orientation to a street
orientation. Furthermore, sociologists have emphasized the importance of “resistance”
in organizations, which, in their view, frequently arises because of worker frustration
over being accorded too little esteem. The model identifies the underlying factors that
lead workers to feel they deserve more esteem. In so doing, it accounts for the presence
or absence of resistance in many settings.
The paper suggests questions for future research, many relating to firms. Our focus
has been on how values form, but a further question – relevant for firms – is: how
might they be manipulated? How, for instance, might firms encourage obedience to
authority (dependent as it is upon the formation of values that promote it)? Howmight
firms structure the workplace so as to prevent workers from negatively influencing one
another? And, howmight firms reduce the likelihood of resistance? Understanding the
answers to these questions will yield insight into firms – as well as other organizations.
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